Hezbollah: From Militia to Social Service Provider 🏥🕊️—Navigating Its Complex Role in Lebanese Politics
Deep Dive with Olga 💬
In this article Olga discusses the post conflict region of Lebanon. She is a student journalist with us on a placement organised by the Department of War Studies, King's College, London. This article was edited Lex.page.
🎧 listen to Olga backstory here - she discusses her motivation & research as well.
From Militia to Community Pillar: Unravelling Hezbollah's Social Work in Lebanon
Hezbollah is often described as “a state within a state,” showing a difference from the Westphalian system. The US labeled it as a terrorist organization in the early 2000s, and its involvement in Middle East conflicts is undeniable. Despite losing seats in the elections, they were the majority in 2019, which is hard to grasp without context (Courrier International, 2022). How could a terrorist organisation be accepted in Lebanese society to the point of being part of the government? An aspect in the international narrative on Hezbollah is its use of community work to gain acceptance. In a country with corrupted elites unable to provide electricity, Hezbollah positioned itself as an alternative provider of goods and services.
How Hezbollah managed to be more than a militia
Hezbollah’s work was enabled by the Taif Accord. After Israel’s occupation during the civil war, the resistance group emerged in 1982 to expel Israel. The war ended with the Taif accord in 1989, which required militias (United Nations, 1989). Hezbollah claimed its existence was justified until Israel left in 2000. After Israel’s withdrawal from the south, Hezbollah gained legitimacy. In 2006, a war occurred because of Hezbollah’s fight against Israel, impacting the country. Hezbollah shifted from a Shiite militia to a resistance militia, seeking a broader identity (May, 2019). The organization continues to fight Israel as it’s seen as a colonial power that should be stopped. This cause explains why the population supports Hezbollah (May, 2019).
The complicated relationship of Hezbollah with the Lebanese population
Hezbollah provides social services and appeals to Lebanese identity, addressing the need for understanding and accountability. Lebanon’s divided society and corruption lead to a dysfunctional government and lack of basic guarantees. Consociationalism aims to account for differences but fails to ensure accountability. Lebanese feel their taxes go to the leaders, and Hezbollah gained parliamentary seats, built infrastructure, and strengthened the military. They contributed to territorial security and medical access, evolving from advocating for Shia to a national role after Israel’s 2000 withdrawal. Despite creating insecurity, Hezbollah’s promise to rebuild attacked suburbs increases respect. Hezbollah strives to become indispensable for Lebanese safety and to feel heard and understood. The Lebanese crave an accountable government to solve day-to-day issues and provide basic services. Due to the weak state, many find Hezbollah more legitimate than politicians.
Education, health...: Hezbollah’s omnipresence in social services
Hezbollah has social units for education and healthcare. The Social unit includes the Khomeini Support Committee, the Foundation of the Wounded, the Jihad Construction Foundation and the Martyrs Foundation, which are critical to Lebanese society. The Jihad Construction Foundation accounted for 45% of the water needs in Beirut's southern suburbs in the early 2000s. It also calculated the cost of reconstruction after the confrontation with Israel. The Martyrs' Foundation reduced the impact of Hezbollah's fighting on the population. The Wounded Foundations cared for injured civilians and conflict victims.
The Islamic Health unit offers healthcare to many Shias at low or no cost, with ample resources. It complements the health system and took over other hospitals when the government couldn’t maintain them.
Hezbollah created an education unit to compensate for the public system (Flanigan, 2008). The militia gains visibility for its state-like institutions and strengthens its position, becoming essential to the country's future, through financial assistance and offering primary and secondary education. The programs in these schools encourage adherence to the organisation's belief system, leading some to become soldiers for Hezbollah (Love, 2010).
The foundations mainly help the Shia community, which was marginalised for a long time and suffered the most precarious conditions. Hezbollah includes all sects to build dependence and maintain influence in the country.
Hezbollah as part of the ‘weak state’ problem?
The overwhelming presence of Iran in Hezbollah’s decision-making process is the elephant in the room, a concern raised by international actors and media (Love, 2010). Iran’s substantial funding of Hezbollah gives it undeniable influence over the group’s goals and priorities. Many of its foundations are based on Iranian models, and its war against Israel aligns with Iran’s interests. When considering Hezbollah’s future role in Lebanon, Tehran’s interference cannot be ignored. There is a clear bias at the heart of Hezbollah, hindering long-term security for the Lebanese. Although Hezbollah promised not to harm its own population, the prospect of a time when that question arises is frightening. While striving to make the population feel heard and safe, it weakens the Lebanese state (Khatib, 2021). The government failed to provide for its population, but was not sponsored by another state. The future of the Lebanese population is uncertain, especially in terms of their identity. Their government has not shown the respect every state owes its population, and the reconciliation work after the civil war never happened. Hezbollah emerged as a solution to the weakness, yet it is part of the problem.
Confronting the cold, hard truth
Hezbollah’s status is hybrid, not solely militia or government party in Lebanese politics. It’s critical in Shia community daily lives. It changes from militia to resistance force providing state-like services, making it hard for international institutions to respond. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is a useful help and long-term issue for citizens. Their contribution is visible. They don’t address government accountability, benefiting from distancing from corruption. The topic of Hezbollah should be discussed in Lebanon’s political system, though the solution isn’t evident.
References
Acha, K. (2015, July 17). The 7 Fundamental Human Needs. Kenneth Acha. https://kennethmd.com/the-7-fundamental-human-needs/
Courier International. (2022, May 16). Au Liban, le Hezbollah fragilisé, la société civile opère une percée. Courier international. https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/elections-au-liban-le-hezbollah-fragilise-la-societe-civile-opere-une-percee
Flanigan, S. T. (2008). Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(6), 499–519. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802065103
Ille, S & D. Mansour-Ille. (2021). Warlord Politics and Economic Clientelism in Lebanon. The economics of peace and security vol 16 (1), pp28-40. https://www.epsjournal.org.uk/index.php/EPSJ/article/view/352
Khatib, L. (2021). How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/2021-06-30-how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-the-lebanese-state-khatib.pdf
Love, J. (2010). Hezbollah: social services as a source of power. Joint Special Operations University. Report 10 (5). https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA525243.pdf
May, S. (2019). The rise of the “resistance axis”: Hezbollah and the legacy of the taif agreement. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 25(1), 115–132. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2019.1565184
United Nations. November 4, 1989. “Taif agreement”. https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf
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